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footing of a purchase of property,
and consequently a tender of the
certificate of stock is i ot a condi-
tion precedent to an action on the
subscription: R. R. v. Dunn, 17
Ind., 6o3; Slipher v. Barhart, 83
Ind., 173; Wemple v. R. R., 120
Ill., i96; Marson v. Deither (Minn.),
52 N. W. Rep., 38.
As a general rule, the Statute of
Limitations does not begin to run
against a subscription to stock un-
til a call is made, either by the
company or by a court of com-
-petent jurisdiction: Williams v.
Taylor (N. Y.), 24 N. R. Rep., 288;
S. C., 12o N. Y., 244; Semple v'.
Glenn (Ala.), 9 So. Rep., 265; Glenn
v. Priest, 48 Fed. Rep., x9; Glenn
a'. M-arbury, i45 U. S., 499; S. C.,
12 Sup. Ct. Rep., .914; but if the
call be not made within a reasona-
ble time, the company will not be
allowed to avail itself of its failure
in the premises to defeat a defense
of the statute : Great West. Tel.
Co. v. Purdy (Iowa), 5o N. W. Rep.,
45. In Pennsylvania the law pre-
sumes an abandonmentof the right
to call after six years from the date
of incorporation, in analogy with
the statute: R. R. v. Byers, 32 Pa.,
22; McCully v. R. R., 32 Pa., 25;
R. R. v. Graham, 36 Pa., 77; Bank
v. Ferguson, 20 W. N. C., 297;
Bank v. Disstolu, 4 Pa. C. C. R.,
201; Bell's App., II5 Pa., 88; but
when the corporation has made an
assignment for the benefit of cred-
itors, the statute runs from the date
of the assignment: Bank v. Bridges,




RICHARD C. MCMURTRIE, LL.D.
Assisted by
SYDNEY G. FISHER, JOHN DOUGLASS BROWN, JR., ROBERT P. BRADFORD..
IN RB FRASCH.1 SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON.
Where there are secured and unsecured creditors of an insolvent, the
secured creditors must first exhaust their security, apply the proceeds to
the diminution of their claim, and then share pro r-ata with other unse-
cured creditors on the balance of their claim.
DISTRIBUTION oEr INsoLVmNTs' BSTAT.-S AmONG CaRDiTo1Ls WITH
AND WITHOUT COILAThRAI SE.CURITY.
The doctrine that one who has that which is the sole dependence
two funds open to him for the pay- of another, has long been estab-
inent of his claim shall not take lished as a favorite in courts of
1.31 Pac. Rep., 755-
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equity, though there is some differ-
ence of opinion as to its origin.
Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves., 388. On
the oneliand, itis claimed that the
equity to compel .a creditor to resort
to the singly charged fund is an
equity against the debtor, and the
reason for this opinion is found in
the fact that before lands were made
liable for the payment of simple
contract debts the satisfaction of a
specialty creditor out of the per-
sonalty of a deceased or insolvent
debtor relieved the realty from all
liability: Aldrich v. Cooper. 2 W.&
L. Cas. Eq., 264. On the other
hand, it is claimed that the equity
is one which exists against the
doubly-secured creditor, and rests
upon the famous principle, sic utere
luo ut non alienum ladas: Story's
_q. Jur., 633, I3 th ed. Whatever
its origin, the doctrine is well rec-
ognized, but there is a class of cases
in Yhich the practicaldifficulties in
th6 way of its application have given
rise to an unwillingness to compel
a resortto the singly-charged fund,
many courts preferring to admin-
ister justice through the doctrine
of subrogation.
The class of cases alluded to em-
braces all cases which involve the
ditribution of the assets of an in-
solvent debtor under proceedings
in bankruptcy and insolvency, and
under assignments for the benefit
of creditors. Of these three meth-
ods it is only necessary to say here
that there is very little difference
between them, since the abolition
of imprisonment for debt, the one
object for which they were all
created being to secure the applica-
tion of an insolvent's estate to the
equal and equitable satisfaction of
the claims against it.
The question suggested by the
principal case is a comparatively
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new one for nost ofthe States, and
the few authorities upon it are con-
flicting. These maybe ranged un-
der three heads: (I) Those which,
as in the 1principal case, favor the
doctrine'of compulsion; (II) Those
which have adopted (what may be
called the trust-fund theory; (III)
Those which favor the doctrine of
subrogation.
I. Those which Favor the Doc-
trine of Corpeulsiox.-In Wurtz v.
Hart, x3 Iowa, 515, which was a
case of an assignment, a creditor
filed a bill to prevent certain other
creditors, to whom had been given
security for their claims, from re-
ceiving a 'dividend -pon the orig-'
inal debt. The Court took the
view that in -such cases collateral
was equal to payment, and com-
pelled the secured creditors to ex-
haust their separate funds, thus
reducing their claims pro tanto.
The case of Third Nat. Bank v.
Lanahan, 66 Md., 461, which was
also that of an assignment, bre-
sented a slightly different question,
whether a secured creditor who has
realized upon his collateral after
the assignment, but before proving
his claim, can demand a divid~end
upon the full amount of his original
debt. As was pointed out by the
Court, the case did not involve the
marshaling of securities, but
merely the ascertainment of the
real amount of the claim, and they
refused to allow the dividend on the
ground that it was the duty of the
trustee under the terms of the .as-
signment to pay ratably and equally
according to their respective
amounts only such debts as were
owed by the assignor. "The obli-
gation of the trustee to pay does
hot depend upon the state of the
account between the creditor and.
the assignor at the time of the as-
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signment, but at the time when
payment is to be inade."1
Amory v. Francis, 16 Mass., 308,
involved the proper distribution of
the estate of an insolvent intestate,
a creditor of whom, secured by a
mortgage, demanded to be allowed
to prove his whole debt and to re-
ceive a dividend upon that sum.
Chief Justice PARKER strongly
commended the doctrine of mar-
shaling for such cases, since in his
judgment the rule which required
the creditor to exhaust his security
would operate to prevent gross
irregularity between the creditors,
and secure a distribution of the es-
tate among all pro rata. Nor was
he deterred by the difficulty in ap-
plying this rule, which springs from
the fact that there is no power to
compel the creditor to sell the mort-
gaged property. The same diffi-
culty was felt in Bell v. Fleming,
12 N. J. Eq., 13, but the rule was,
nevertheless, approved. The diffi-
culty, however, is not great, for the
assignee may either compound the
value of the security with the cred-
itor, or failingin the agreement, can
file a bill to compel a sale of the
property. See, also, Bristol Bank
v. Woodward, 137 Mass., 412.' But
it seems probable that the desire of
the secured creditor to participate
in the distribution would remove
the difficulty by leading him to take
the initiative.
In Wheat v. Dingle, 32S. C., 473,
which was aiso a probate case, the
question was again raised whether
a creditor having real securityupon
which he has realized, after proof of
his claim, should receive a dividend
upon the claim as proved. The
Ccurt held that he could not. In
this case a distinction was made
be .,-een security which is part of
t .h -state itself, and security fur-
nished by third~persons. The latter
is not liable to the claims of the
general creditors of the estate, and
they have no right to claim any
benefit from its use; ifi other words,
there can be no marshaling unless
both funds belong to the estate.
Thedistinction seems to be founded
on reason and equity: Dickson v.
Chorn, 6 Iowa, 19.
The argumentwhich runs through
all these cases is that this rule of
compulsion is best calculated to
produce an equal distribution
among all the creditors; for other-
wise collateral would give to the
creditor an advantage which it was
not intended he should have, would
in fact, whatever its proportion to
the debt, practically operate as se-
curity for the whole. In justice,
however, to the unsecured creditors
the partially secured creditor should
stand on an equal footingwiththem
as regards the amount by which his
security is less than his debt. The
argument is thus illustrated in the
principal case: A assigns his estate,
worth $15,ooo, including security,
in the hands of B, worth $5ooo.
B has a claim against the estate of
$5ooo, secured as mentioned above,
and an unsecured claim of $5ooo.
C has an unsecured claim of $io,ooo.
Deducting the securities from the
assets, the estate has $ro,ooo with
which to pay claims aggregating
$2o,ooo, and as a consequence pays
fifty cents on the dollar. B is al-
lowed apro rata on hiswhole claim
of $io,ooo, which gives him $5ooo.
He then makes the other $5ooo out
of his security, and in consequence
has his whole. debt paid in full.
Thus, on his unsecured debt of
$5ooo, he receives $5ooo, while C,
on his unsecured debt, receives only
$2500.
In support of this view the criti-
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ism in Bell v. Fleming, -su!ira,
of the decision' in Greenwood v.
Taylor, i-Russ. & My:, x85, is sig-
fificant. "If he (theMaster of the
Rolls) had simply declared that he
would adopt the rule (of compul-
* sion)'pon the broad ground that
equality is equity, it is quite proba-
ble it would have been followed
without its propriety being 'ques-
tioned."
, II. The Trust Fund Theory.-
This view is at present.confined to
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island,-
and has be~n stated very clearly in,
a case in tle former State: A cred-
itor whose debt was represented by
three judgments against the in-
solyent, for which he had certain
s'curity, had, after the assignment
but before a dividend had been
declared, realized on the said
security enough to satisfy two of
the judgments in full and the third
in part. The Supreme Court, per
SaARSWOOD, J., overruling the
court below, decided that he was
entitledto a- dividend upon the
amount of his original claim, on
the ground that an assignment is
an appropriation by the debtor of
his estate for a specific purpose for
which it was already liable. It is,
in fact, a trust for all the creditors
then existing pro rata without re-
gard-to the nature of any security
they.might hold. The relation of
creditor is changed to that of equit-
able owner, and the interest of any
one of them extelnds to the amount
of his whole original claim. If in
this case the creditor had not real-
ized on the.land he could have
claimed a dividend on the whole
debt, and payment of part of it did
not affect him because his right was
fixed as one of the original cestuis
que trust., and he stood on. that
until his entire interest should be
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extinguished: Graeff's App., 79
Pa., 146; and see Miller's App., 35
Pa., 481; Patten's App., 45 Pa.,
151.
The same theory is practically
adopted in Rhode Island in a case
where the assignment was for the
equal benefit of all the creditors in
proportion to their respective
claims: Allen v. Davidson,-15 P. I.,
480, overruling an earlier case
which had adopted the doctrine of
compulsion: In re Knowles, 13 R.
1.,9o.
These are' crtainly extreme
cases. Part payment of "a debt
ought under all circumstances to
operate as a Pro tanto- discharge of
it, and thereseems- to be no valid
reason why a.payment made after
the assignment should not, be
treatedl in the same way that it
would have been -if made before.
It is inequitable to the other cred-
itors that that which is no 'longer a
claim should still, by a fiction, be
considered one.
-At all events, this theory would
hardly apply to probate cases.
II. The Doctrine of 'Subroga-
tion.-This is the more general
rule, and the argument in support
of it is based upon the principle
that a creditor having a double
security has a right to proceed
against both and make the best he
can out of both. ,The general doc-
trine of compulsion is approved,
but the courts point out that such
cases as: those uhder discussion
come within the proviso to that
doctrine, namely, that it will not
be applied when it will trench-upon
the rights or operate to the preju-
dice of the party entitled to the
double fund. This is stated in a
case where the secured creditor had
three different funds, -neither of
which was sufficient of itself to
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pay the whole claim. The Court
refused to reduce the claim by the
amount which the creditor bad
received from a sale of his securi-
ties, and allowed a dividend upon.
the whole original amount Logan
v. Anderson, i8 B. MoD., IT4; and
see City Bank v. Patterson, 78 Ky.,
291.
In Illinois the same rule was
applied, as carrying out the pro-
visions of the statute governing'
such cases, to the case of a creditor
who was secured by a deed of trust
of certain land, but who had proved
her claim to the full amount. The
assignee proposed to pay her a
dividend after subtracting the value
of the security, but the Court, fol-
lowing what it declared to be the
weight of authority, ordered a divi-
dend to .be paid on the amount of
the claim as proved. Additional
reason for this was'found in the
terms of the statute, which pro-
vided that all debts and liabilities
should be paid pro rata. The
original claim was part of the ex-
isting indebtedness, and, "if she
does not get a distributive share on
the full amount of her claim it can-
not be said that the assets of the
assignment have been paid pro
79ala upon the existing indebted-
ness:" Paddock v. Bates, 19 Ill.
App., 470, and see In re Bates, iiS
Ill., 524.
Michigan has also adopted this
rule: Third Nat. Bank v. Haug, 82
Mich., 607, though Judge MORSE
delivered an able dissenting opin-
ion. In this case, where the rule
was applied to the claim of a mort-
gagee despite the fact that he had
realized upon his security, the Court
conid-;ercd that the question was
ruled by the case of Southern
Michigan Bank v. Byles, 67 Mich.,
-96, but in that case paymentupon
the claim had been made by third
persons.
This rule has recently found
favor in New York, notwithstand-
ing the earlier case of Besley v,.
Lawrence, ii Paige Ch., 581, which
strongly asserts the doctrine of
marshaling. The receivers of an
insolvent corporation objected to
the proof of a claim in full by. a
creditor who had already realized
largely on collateral securities
which he held, but the Court
ruled that a securei creditor can
bring in his whole claim and have
dividends accordingly. To rule
otherwise would be to hold that the
contractual relations of a debtor
and his creditor were changed by
insolvency, a view which the Court
emphatically disclaimed. By his
contract the creditor has a right to
hold the security until his debt is
fullypaid, and there is no principle
of equity which can compel him to
part with it before that time. Of
this case it may be said that it is
hard to see the connection between
the premise and the conclusion; in
other words, how refusing to com-
pel the creditor to exhaust his
security involves refusing to accept
it as payment when he himself ex-
hausts it.
Almost all of the cases which
refuse to apply the doctrine of com-
pulsion are cases where the creditor
had security on realty. In the case
of mortgages the Court has gener-
ally been deterred by the difficulty
of compelling a foreclosure or of
estimating the value of tht security
in case of refusal to compound:
Findlay v. Hosmer, 2 Conn., 350;
Moser v. Raubet, 2 N. H., 488;
Walker v. Barker, 26 Vt., 710. But
where the mortgagee has already
converted his security into money
and thereby reduced his claim,
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there would seem to be no diffichlty --in proportion to their several
in the way of restrictingithe divi- amounts. The possession of secur--
dend to the remaining portion of ity gives no peculiar virtue to a
such claim! West v, Bank of Rut- creditor's claim, foi. he has nothing
land, 19 Vt., 403. It is no longer more than a lien.upon theproperty
a question of compulsion, for the conveyed. The priority which is
creditor of his own accord has used thus given tohis claim would seem
his security, and all .that is asked to be a sufficient reward for his.
is that a just and proper effect be diligence. The fund is limited, all
given to his act. , are entitled to share in it upon an
The difficulty with this class of equal basis,. and the unsecured
cases lies in their maintaining that creditors have a right to ask that a
insolvency leaves the contractual secured creditor, who is, in fact,
relations between debtor and cred- partially unsecured, should be so
itoe unchanged; %that is, that the considered.
right which the latter had, should , Several of the States have settled
.he sue the debtor, to disregaril the the matter by statutes in which
secttrity ought still to be his when they havepractically embodied the
he comes. to prove his claim. In 2oth secidion of-the Bankruptcy Act
* answer" t6 this'- position it may be of I867, which-provided that the
said, (I) that a creditor who exhib- creditors who held security Pad'the
Its' his demand for a dividend has option either to prove for the bal-
somnewhat changed his relation to ance of their claim'or to surrender
the debtor, inasmuch as he. has . the property held as security, and
given. up the right to a personal prove for their whole debt.
suit upon his claim; (2) that a differ- , Such is the law in California (In-
entpersonal equity is involved, the solv. Act, i88o, 44;-App. to Civil
equity of fellow creditors, the Code); for rights of a mortgagee,
quality, of whose claim is not affect- see Montgomery v. Merrill, 62 Cal.,
ed by lack of security. 385; Indiana (Rev. Stat., x888,
The whole estate is practically in 2674, ch. 13 1; Massachusetts (Pub.
court, and the object of courts of Stat., 1882, C. 157, 28); New Hamp-
equity in distributing an estate shire (Pub. Stat., 1891, C.201, ' 20);
among its creditors s to makethat Texas (I Sayle's Civ. Stat., Art.
use of every portion of it which 65u., p. 67); Vermont (Rev. Laws,
'will satisfy as far as possible, and 188o, x802).,
:ith strict impartiality, all claims RoBnRT P, BnAnroRn.
Norz.
How very much the problem of the relative rights of creditors on
different secuities7would be simplihed if the meaning of words always
used in stating the rule was only attended to! The only pretence for
interference with a creditor having several securities in favor of one who
has fewer is equity. Now, if we adopt the vulgar or less scientific mean-
ing of that word, and will stop long enough to comprehend that mean-
ing, can any one fail to see that no man can have a secilrity taken from
him because he has many securities, even though all are ample, any
more than the rich can be compelled to share his income with the poor?
His securities are his by law, and equity can deprive no man of his legal
